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The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
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An Empirical Examination




This paper uses a multivariate logistic regression model to examine empiri-
cally and quantify for the first time the effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) on the Chapter 11 landscape.
Two samples are tested: a general sample consisting of firms from various corpo-
rate sectors, and a sample consisting only of retailers.  Both studies show that
the 2005 amendments had a statistically significant effect on traditional Chap-
ter 11 practice.  In particular, post-BAPCPA we observe a rise in rapid disposi-
tions through the form of a sale of all or substantially all debtor assets.  Indeed,
in the post-amendments era, debtors are increasingly using § 363 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to exit Chapter 11 within a few months after filing for bankruptcy.
Now debtors do not spend time negotiating with their creditors to write down
debt, but instead seek a strategic buyer at the outset of the case, or liquidate in
the early stages of the Chapter 11 proceedings.  This trend can be attributed to
certain 2005 provisions that have the effect of depleting the debtor of the two
elements most necessary for a lengthy case: money and time.
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA),1 enacted on October 17, 2005, represents one of the most com-
prehensive reforms of the Bankruptcy Code.  Even though it primarily ad-
*S.J.D. Candidate (2014), Fordham University School of Law.  This paper was prepared as part of a
broader S.J.D. dissertation thesis that examines the changing business bankruptcy landscape.  I am grateful
to my supervisor, Professor Richard Squire, for invaluable suggestions on earlier drafts of this project.  I
would also like to thank Professor Sean Griffith, Professor Thomas Lee, and Professor Michael Simkovic
for helpful comments and suggestions.
1Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005).
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dresses consumer bankruptcy, BAPCPA also enacted or modified several
business-bankruptcy provisions that stirred a heated debate regarding their
effect on the Chapter 11 landscape and their policy implications.  There are
two schools of thought: those who maintain that BAPCPA has made bank-
ruptcy more difficult and burdensome for debtors (especially retailers), en-
couraging fast-track liquidations; and those who argue that the statute simply
rationalized an already lengthy and burdensome process.
Scholars and practitioners siding with the first view attribute the enact-
ment of BAPCPA to lobbying by creditors and other special-interest groups.
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code has always been viewed as debtor-friendly,
triggering attempts on part of non-debtor constituencies to strengthen their
position within the bankruptcy process.2  BAPCPA is considered to be a
continuation of this lobbying trend, aiming to reduce bankruptcy courts’ dis-
cretion to meet the needs of rehabilitation and reorganization of a debtor.3
As one commentator notes, BAPCPA might be special interests’ biggest vic-
tory.4  Indeed, at first glance, the 2005 amendments seem to create a “credi-
tor-in-possession” Chapter 11 model, while depleting the debtor even more of
cash.  This change in dynamics, coinciding with the unfavorable
macroeconomic conditions since 2008, has in theory left the debtor with less
time and money to reorganize successfully.  Within this context, BAPCPA
opponents argue that the new and modified provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code hurt the debtor’s reorganization chances and thus should be repealed.
An attempt to this direction was made in 2009 by Representative Jerald
Nadler (D-NY), who proposed, unsuccessfully, the “Business Reorganization
and Job Preservation Act.”5
On the other side of the debate, there are scholars and practitioners who
maintain that BAPCPA merely rationalized the Chapter 11 process without
effectuating any material change in the business bankruptcy landscape.
BAPCPA, they argue, was designed to allow only the strongest of companies
2Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11—From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L. J. 375,
388 (2007) (“Despite valiant efforts by the reformers, § 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, carried forward
from the former Bankruptcy Act special protections for sellers, financiers and lessors of certain types of
equipment relating to aircraft, railroads and vessels.  Using that piece of special interest legislation as a
foundation, other creditor groups pressed Congress for legislative containment of the bankruptcy court
and the debtor-in-possession’s powers.  Congress has been generous in responding to the ‘needs’ of these
special interest groups.”).
3Id. at 387. See, e.g., Richard Levin & Alessia Raney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11:
The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 603 (2005) (additionally attributing the enactment of BAPCPA to Congres-
sional overreaction to the Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and other scandals); Biana Borukhovich,
BAPCPA: The Nail in the Coffin for Retailers, Pratt’s Journal of Bankruptcy Law, Vol. 6 No. 5 (2010)
(discussing the adverse effect that the 2005 amendments had on retailer-debtors’ liquidity).
4Miller, supra note 2, at 388.
5H.R. 1942, 111th Cong. (2009).
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to survive, producing, therefore, more economically efficient results.6  Ac-
cording to this view, the 2005 amendments did not result in more liquida-
tions; instead they merely sped up the dissolution of economically failed
companies that would have liquidated regardless.7  Furthermore, these credi-
tor-friendly provisions might not have had the intense effect attributed to
them since, in practice, it seems that courts have attempted to strike a better
balance between creditors’ and debtors’ interests.
The extent of BAPCPA’s actual effect on business bankruptcies remains
to be tested.  This study is, to my knowledge, the first to attempt to examine
empirically and quantify BAPCPA’s effects on the business-bankruptcy land-
scape.  Two samples are examined: a general sample consisting of firms from
various corporate sectors, with the only exception of finance, insurance, and
real estate companies, and a sample consisting only of retailers.  Both studies
show that the 2005 amendments have had a statistically significant effect on
traditional Chapter 11 practice.  In particular, post-BAPCPA we observe a
rise in rapid dispositions through the form of a pre-plan sale of all or substan-
tially all debtor assets.  Debtors are increasingly using § 363 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to exit Chapter 11 within a few months after filing for
bankruptcy.  However, contrary to what is widely maintained, BAPCPA did
not have a statistically significant effect on the rate of debtor emergences.
Therefore, from a normative point of view, repealing the amendments, as
BAPCPA’s opponents advocate, would not increase the proportion of firms
emerging from their Chapter 11 filing.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the scholarly literature
that comments specifically on the 2005 amendments and their potential effect
on Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Part II summarizes previous empirical scholarly
work that examines and quantifies the relationship between various
6See Circuit City Unplugged: Why did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?, Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Repre-
sentatives, 111 Cong., 1st Session (March 11, 2009) (hereinafter, Circuit City Unplugged) (prepared
statement of Professor Zywicki).  Professor Zywicki argues that “by bringing about a swift and decisive
resolution of a failing company’s prospects, thereby clearing the field for more vibrant competitors to grow,
BAPCPA’s impact in many cases is unquestionably productive,” while, he continues, “the overarching
purpose of chapter 11 reorganization is to distinguish between firms that are economically failed and those
that are in financial distress.  An economically-failed firm is one that is essentially better-off dead than
alive—shut down operations and reallocate the financial, human, and physical capital of the enterprise
elsewhere in the economy.  A firm in financial distress is one that simply needs to reallocate its capital
structure in order to be a prosperous enterprise.  Chapter 11 exists to reorganize firms in financial distress
but not those that are economically-failed.  There is reason to believe that some of the retailers that have
liquidated in recent months are economically-failed firms, rather than merely financially-distressed.  Hence,
efforts to reorganize and save those companies would likely be economically inefficient.” Id.
7See Bruce S. Nathan et al., BAPCPA Rollback As A Cure For Unsuccessful Reorganizations? Not So
Fast!, Bus. Reorg. Comm. Newsl. (American Bankruptcy Institute, Alexandria, Va.) (March 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num4/not_so_fast.pdf.
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microeconomic and macroeconomic factors and Chapter 11 outcomes.  Part
III lays out the methodology and results of the study. Part IV contains the
conclusions.
I. BAPCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CHAPTER 11
LANDSCAPE
A. PLAN EXCLUSIVITY
One of the main advantages that Chapter 11 offers to distressed firms is
that it allows them to remain in control of the case.  It is true that the
“debtor-in-possession” (DIP) concept has attracted distressed companies to
file for reorganization at early sight of their financial troubles by assuring
them that they will be largely able to control the process.  One of the most
important provisions that gives such control to the debtor refers to the
debtor’s “exclusivity” right—namely, the fact that it is the only party in in-
terest permitted to file a plan of reorganization within a given period after
commencement of the case.8
Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,9 debtors had an unlim-
ited exclusivity right that gave them strong bargaining leverage over their
creditors.  Naturally, creditors, whose money was in the firm and yet had no
say in the formulation of a plan, pushed for changes.  The 1978 Bankruptcy
Code eased the tension between these two constituencies by enacting § 1121
and, for the first time, placing a time limit on the debtor’s exclusive right to
file a plan of reorganization.  Legislative history notes that Congress in draft-
ing the Bankruptcy Code took into consideration the importance of the
debtor’s remaining in control of the process.10  At the same time, however,
the legislative history acknowledges that:
8See, e.g., Yongqing Ren, Examining the Efficiency of the Exclusivity Period of the Reorganization Law: Is
It Better than a Plan- Competition System?, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 7 (2011); Ross L. Weston,
The Exclusivity Period in Section 1121: How Exclusive is it?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 639 (1990); Eric W.
Lam, Of Exclusivity and for Cause: 11 U.S.C. Section 1121(d) Re-examined, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 533 (1986/
1987).
9Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 541 (repealed 1978).
10H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232 (“Proposed Chapter 11 recognizes the need for
the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions in
the bill until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy. At the same time, the bill recognizes
the legitimate interests of creditors, whose money is in the enterprise as much as the debtor’s, to have a
say in the future of the company.”). See also Weston, supra note 8, at 651 (“When section 1121 was first
proposed in its current form, Congress was aware of the need to lessen the debtor’s bargaining leverage
without removing it completely. A balance was necessary to encourage debtors to timely file under Chap-
ter 11 and to grant creditors some control over the proceeding.”); Mark G. Douglas, Assessing the Impact
of New Chapter 11 Exclusivity Deadline (Jones Day) (January/February 2007) (“Armed with exclusivity
throughout the case, a debtor could hold creditors hostage to its own reorganization agenda and threaten
to convert to a liquidating case if creditors were reluctant to do so. Lawmakers attempted to remove what
was considered undue bargaining leverage when they enacted the Bankruptcy Code.”), available at http://
www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3936.
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The exclusive right gives the debtor undue bargaining lever-
age, because by delay he can force a settlement out of other-
wise unwilling creditors, and they have little recourse except
to move for conversion of the case to chapter X.  That is [as]
contrary to their interests as it is to the debtor’s, and thus is
rarely done.  The debtor is in full control, often to the unfair
disadvantage of creditors.11
BAPCPA left § 1121 largely unchanged, modifying, however, subsection
(d)(2).  In particular, § 1121(b) provides that the debtor has the exclusive
right to file a reorganization plan for 120 days after the filing of the case.  If
the debtor does not succeed in filing a plan, then any other party in interest
can.12  If, however, the debtor does file a plan, then it is afforded an extra 60
days to solicit acceptances.13  Both periods can be reduced or increased by
the bankruptcy court for cause.14  Nevertheless, and contrary to the pre-
BAPCPA Code, court-ordered increases may not extend beyond 18 and 20
months, respectively, after commencement of the case.15  This cap on exten-
sions, added by BAPCPA, is the one that has stirred a heated debate over its
potential effects on traditional reorganizations.
Prior to the enactment of the 2005 amendments, courts would routinely
grant extensions of the exclusivity period.  As a result, the debtor often en-
joyed an exclusive right that lasted several years.  Undoubtedly, limiting the
time that the debtor spends in bankruptcy is in the best interest of all parties
involved.  However, commentators emphasize the adverse effect the exclusiv-
ity cap might have on the plan negotiation process, especially when it comes
to large and complex cases.16  Indeed, firms such as airlines, which often con-
front multiple unions and other complex issues, may find the new exclusivity
period inadequate for the formulation of a viable plan, even if the maximum
extension is granted.17  Additionally, creditors may now have less incentive
to cooperate with the debtor.  Non-debtor parties could just wait for the
exclusivity period to expire in order to present and pursue their own plans,
which usually provide for the liquidation of the debtor.18  Alternatively,
11H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 231 (1978).
1211 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
1311 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(3).
1411 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(1).
1511 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A), (B).
16See, e.g., Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L. J. 174, 202 (2012) (noting that
when it comes to exceptionally large debtors that face unique legal issues, the deadline set forth by modi-
fied section 1121 might not be enough).
17Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on Exclusivity Is Hard to Gauge (July, 2007), available at
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=7797.
18Id.; see also Ted Janger, Crystal and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 621 (2001) (“Where the judge cannot extend the exclusive period beyond a
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creditors could use the exclusivity cap as leverage in their negotiations with
the distressed company, conditioning exclusivity extensions on certain coop-
erative steps that should be taken by the debtor.19
It follows that debtors have lost pursuant to BAPCPA much of the con-
trol they previously enjoyed over the Chapter 11 process.  This might have
created a disincentive for them to pursue a traditional Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion.  Consequently, a § 363 disposition of all the assets at an early stage of
the case could be an appealing alternative.
B. SELLERS OF GOODS
i. § 503(b)(9) Claims: Elevating Pre-Petition Trade Claims
Section 1129(a)(9)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth an “administra-
tive solvency” test.  Pursuant to this test, a reorganization plan can be con-
firmed only if the debtor can pay, by the plan’s effective date, all
administrative expenses in full and in cash.  Prior to the enactment of
BAPCPA, the term “administrative expenses” was limited to operational ex-
penses incurred post-petition20 plus expenses associated with the reorganiza-
tion procedure itself (e.g. professional fees).21  However, the 2005
amendments added several new categories of administrative expenses.22  One
of these new provisions deals with the treatment of vendors’ pre-petition
claims.  In particular, § 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code creates an adminis-
trative claim for goods received by the debtor within twenty days prior to
the petition date, provided that such goods were sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of business.  Before BAPCPA, these pre-petition trade credi-
tors’ claims were treated as general unsecured claims, meaning that they were
subject to plan voting and hence could be compromised without the credi-
tor’s consent.23
Undoubtedly, this new provision confers significant benefits to suppliers
of goods.24  Due to their new administrative status, not only will these claims
have to be paid in full, but also creditors may demand prompt payment even
certain point, regardless of the reason for the debtor’s failure to confirm a plan (which might just as well be
a product of creditor recalcitrance as debtor delay), creditors who oppose the plan are given a strong
incentive to hold out until the twenty month period has expired”).
19Schlerf, supra note 17.
2011 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1).
2111 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (2)-(6).
2211 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(7)-(9).
23See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(1), 1126(c).
24According to Article 2 of the UCC, “goods” are defined as all things moveable at the time of identifi-
cation to the contract for sale.  Courts adopted this definition of “goods”; see, e.g., In re Goody’s Family
Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 131, 134; In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 397 B.R. 828, 836; In re Deer, No. 06-
02460, 2008 WL 723982, **1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. June 14, 2007).  Therefore, vendors of services or value
do not fall under § 503(b)(9).
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before the confirmation of the plan.25  The question that begs then is
whether and to what extent the debtor is affected.  Many scholars and prac-
titioners have maintained that by elevating these previously general un-
secured claims to administrative expenses, BAPCPA reduces the debtor’s
liquidity, thereby reducing its chances for a successful stand-alone reorganiza-
tion.26  Especially when the debtor is a retailer relying on receiving a high
volume of inventory on a consistent basis, this effect can be exacerbated.  The
main argument is that by adding to the set of administrative expenses, this
provision reduces the debtor’s flexibility to reorganize.  Furthermore, the sat-
isfaction of these pre-petition claims, which in the case of retailers can reach
hundreds of millions of dollars, requires the consumption of post-petition re-
sources that could be used instead to pay operating and other expenses that
are necessary to preserve the estate and guide the debtor into reorganization.
This diversion of post-petition resources in satisfaction of pre-petition claims,
in turn, can discourage DIP lenders from lending to finance a traditional reor-
ganization effort.27
As a practical matter, bankruptcy courts might have mitigated the poten-
tially adverse impact of § 503(b)(9) on a debtor’s liquidity.  Based on their
established discretionary authority as to the timing of the payment of all
other administrative expenses, they have generally denied allowing immediate
payment of § 503(b)(9) claims as well.28  Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code does
not explicitly provide for immediate payment of § 503(b)(9) claims.  It fol-
lows then, courts have held, that such claims will be treated as all other
administrative expenses claims,29 and when deciding the timing of such pay-
ments, courts will take into consideration: a) prejudice to the debtor, b) hard-
ship to the claimant, and c) potential detriment to other creditors.30
2511 U.S.C. § 503(a).
26See, e.g., Levin & Raney-Marinelli, supra note 3, at 605; Michael G. Wilson & Henry P. Long,
Section 503(b)(9)’s Impact: A Proposal to Make Chapter 11 Viable Again for Retail Debtors, 30 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 20 (Feb. 2011).
27Testimony of Lawrence C. Gottlieb, The Disappearance of Retail Reorganization in the Post-
BAPCPA Era, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law (Sept. 25, 2008).
28Brendan Gage, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)?, ABI L. REV., 215, 244
(2011) (“Most courts now apply the Garden Ridge factors to twenty-day claims, with nearly all of them
deferring payment.”).
29See In re Bookbinder’s Restaurant Inc., No. 06-12302ELF, 2006 WL 3858020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec.
28, 2006) (“The text of § 503(b)(9) neither states nor even implies that allowance of the expense encom-
passes an unqualified right to immediate payment.  Nor does the text of the provision suggest that an
administrative expense allowed under § 503(b)(9) is to be treated in a more favorable manner than any
other allowed § 503(b) administrative expense.”); see also In re Global Home Products LLC, No. 06-
10340, 2006 WL 3791955 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2006), *3 (“[t]he parties agree that when a claimant
timely files a request for payment of an administrative expense under § 503(a), the timing of the payment
of that administrative expense claim is left to the discretion of the court”).
30See In re Garden Ridge Corporation, 323 B.R. 136, 143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
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Nevertheless, the question remains whether the new § 503(b)(9) can in-
crease administrative expenses to a degree that could indeed jeopardize the
chances for a stand-alone reorganization.  According to the following argu-
ments, the answer is no.  Instead, what § 503(b)(9) does is create a more
predictable system for vendors who, until then, were relying for repayment of
their pre-petition claims on securing a spot in the debtor’s “critical vendor”
list.  To be sure, even prior to the enactment of BAPCPA debtors would
move, usually in first-day orders, to pay the pre-petition claims of their key
trade creditors, namely those that were essential to their continued opera-
tions, in exchange for post-petition terms more favorable to the debtor.
These payments would naturally come from post-petition resources, leaving
fewer assets for post-petition creditors and other operating expenses.  Courts
would more often than not allow these payments.31  Furthermore, over the
course of several years, debtors started characterizing an increasing number of
vendors as “critical,” thereby significantly disturbing the priority scheme laid
down by the Bankruptcy Code and adversely affecting the debtor’s liquid-
ity.32  For example, in 2004, Kmart sought and obtained approval from the
Bankruptcy Court to pay 2,330 out of its 4,000 vendors as “critical.”  This
translated into payment of $300 million of pre-petition claims, which came
from the $2 billion of DIP financing that Kmart had secured.  The remaining,
less-lucky vendors received, along with the rest of the unsecured creditors,
about 10¢ on the dollar, mostly in stock of the reorganized Kmart.  The Dis-
trict Court reversed and the debtor appealed.  The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the District Court’s decision that set forth more stringent standards
for the granting of “critical vendor” orders.33  Nevertheless, the Kmart case is
indicative of a pathology that had eroded the priority scheme laid down by
the Bankruptcy Code in favor of certain general unsecured creditors who had
the clout to achieve “critical” status.34  Therefore, proponents of § 503(b)(9)
assert that the provision puts a halt to this system that seemingly favored
31See Travis N. Turner, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 431, 434 (2006).  Bankruptcy courts have been granting “critical vendors” orders relying on
§105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code stating that “[t]he court may issue any order, process or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title,” and the “doctrine of necessity.” Id.
32Robert A. Morris, The Case Against “Critical Vendor” Motions, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30
(Sept. 2003) (“It has become commonplace to seek bankruptcy court approval to pay certain pre-petition
unsecured liabilities because of the alleged “critical nature” of certain suppliers, goods and services in order
to preserve the going-concern value of the debtor’s business. . . . Critical vendor motions are unnecessary in
most cases.  They also increase the funding requirements of chapter 11 cases and circumvent the absolute
priority rule, one of the fundamental tenets of bankruptcy law. ”); see also Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error:
Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 414
(2003) (“Without any provision of the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizing its action, a court may
routinely violate one of the Code’s basic-canons: thou shall treat all similarly situated creditors equally.”).
33In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Circuit, 2004).
34Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 6 (testimony of Professor Zywicki).
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powerful vendors by clearly setting the rules of the game.35  In any case,
§ 503(b)(9) does not affect a debtor’s liquidity more than the “critical ven-
dors” orders did.
What the proponents of § 503(b)(9) fail to recognize, however, is that
the provision does not dispose of the “critical vendors” system.  Creditors
qualifying for administrative status under § 503(b)(9) can still move for “crit-
ical” status as well.36  Not only that, but as one commentator notes,
§ 503(b)(9) “is now increasingly used as an added justification for granting
critical trade vendor motions.”37  Indeed, it seems logical that since BAPCPA
treats these creditors as administrative claimants who must be paid in full
ahead of unsecured creditors, there is no reason the debtor should not be
allowed to pay these claimants at the beginning of the case.38  Additionally,
pursuant to § 503(b)(9), administrative priority is not limited to critical ven-
dors.  Instead, all sellers of goods, whether critical or not, can achieve admin-
istrative status provided that they meet the few and straightforward
§ 503(b)(9) requirements.39
ii. § 546(c): Expanded Reclamation Claim
Another important BAPCPA amendment was the expansion of reclama-
tion rights.  Reclamation is broadly defined as the right of a seller to “re-
claim”—that is, recover possession of goods that were delivered to an
insolvent buyer.  This right is provided by U.C.C. § 2-70240 and, within the
bankruptcy context, is protected and limited by 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) as modi-
fied by the 2005 amendments.41
Until the enactment of BAPCPA and § 503(b)(9), reclamation was the
35Id.
36Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 6 (testimony of Richard Pachulski).
37Shirley Cho, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy After BAPCPA—A Closer Look At: Critical Trade; Exclusiv-
ity; and Dismissal/Conversion, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 79, 79 (2009).
38Id. at 80 (citing several cases as examples, e.g. In re Dana Corporation, et al., 358 B.R. 567 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Oneida Ltd., et al., 400 B.R. 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
39Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter
11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 205 (2005).
40U.C.C. § 2-702 provides in pertinent part: “Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received
goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within three
months before delivery the ten-day limitation does not apply.  Except as provided in this subsection the
seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer’s fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of
solvency or of intent to pay,” while successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with
respect to them.
4111 U.S.C. § 546(c), both pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA, does not create a reclamation right.  It
merely protects and limits the reclamation right provided by U.C.C. § 2-702.  It should be noted, how-
ever, that the elimination of “statutory or common-law right” from the language of modified § 546(c) has
given rise to certain voices maintaining that new § 546(c) creates a federal reclamation right.
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sole remedy available to pre-petition sellers of goods.42  Under former
§ 546(c), a seller that had a statutory or common law right to reclaim posses-
sion could exercise such right for goods delivered to an insolvent buyer in the
ordinary course of business within ten days before the bankruptcy filing, pro-
vided that certain other procedural requirements were met.43  Bankruptcy
courts had discretion to deny reclamation by granting the sellers, in lieu of
such right, either an administrative expense claim or a secured lien.44  Recla-
mation rights were subject, however, to previous secured interests in the
inventory.  Indeed, courts would recognize the superiority of a previous lien
on the reclaimed goods by relying on the “good faith purchaser” clause of
U.C.C. § 2-702(3) and would deny sellers actual repossession.45  In that case,
the value of the reclamation claim would be determined by the value of the
collateral that was under the floating lien.  It follows that if an undersecured
creditor foreclosed on the reclaimed goods and used the entire proceeds to
satisfy its secured debt, the reclaiming seller’s claim would be rendered
worthless.46
BAPCPA amended this provision in several ways.  Under new § 546(c),
courts can no longer grant substitute remedies, while it is now explicitly
codified that reclamation rights are subject to “the prior rights of a holder of a
security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof.”47  Most importantly,
BAPCPA expanded the reclamation reach-back period.  Namely, under the
amended § 546(c), a seller may establish a reclamation claim for goods deliv-
42Hon. Cecilia G. Morris, Reclamation Rights After BAPCPA: 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) and 503(b)(9),
Unsecured Trade Creditors’ Committee Newsl., ABI (July 25-28, 2007).
43Prior to BAPCPA, § 546(c) had merely incorporated the U.C.C. 10-day period and provided as
follows: “The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 of this title are
subject to any statutory or common-law right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor, in the
ordinary course of such seller’s business, to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods while
insolvent, but (1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands in writing
reclamation of such goods, (A) before 10 days after receipt of such goods by the debtor; or (B) if such 10-
day period expires after the commencement of the case, before 20 days after receipt of such goods by the
debtor; and (2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made
such a demand only if the court, (A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as a claim of a kind specified
in section 503(b) of this title; or (B) secures such claim by a lien.”
4411 U.S.C. § 546(c) (prior to BAPCPA).
45See, e.g., Lavonia Manufacturing Co. v. Emery Corp., 52 B.R. 944, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Diversi-
fied Food Services Distributors, Inc., 130 B.R. 427, 429-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re MacMillan Petro-
leum (Arkansas), Inc., 115 B.R. 175, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990).
46Lisa S. Gretchko, The Bankruptcy Reform Act One Year Later: A Disappointment for Trade Credi-
tors, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 (Feb. 2007). See, e.g., In re Leeds Building Products, Inc., 141 B.R.
265, 269; Pester Refining Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Refining Company), 964 F.2d 842, 847.
4711 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1); of course, the subordination of the reclamation right to previous perfected
secured interests in the inventory decreases the importance of this remedy to prepetition sellers. See, e.g.,
Brett Berlin et al., Business Bankruptcy Panel, Hot Topics in Retail Bankruptcy, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
343, 368 (“. . . reclamation rights are subject to the rights of a lender that’s got a lien on inventory, and if
that lender is not oversecured in inventory, then your reclamation claim may be valueless.”).
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ered to an insolvent buyer within forty-five days before the date of the bank-
ruptcy filing as opposed to ten under the old regime.48
The expansion of the reach-back reclamation period naturally means that
more goods will be subject to that right compared to the pre-BAPCPA pe-
riod.  Even though the significance of this modification is watered down by
the enactment of § 503(b)(9)—since now § 546(c) will mainly benefit the
sellers of goods delivered between twenty-one and forty-five days before
commencement of the case—these two provisions combined could cause a
debtor to reach an administrative insolvency state at an early stage of the
case.49  Additionally, by eliminating substitute remedies, the debtor might be
increasingly deprived of goods that would most likely be essential to its con-
tinuing operations.
iii. Utility Services: § 366 Amended
Within the same context of elevating the rights of specific creditors,
BAPCPA amended § 366 of the Bankruptcy Code, which deals with the
post-petition relationship between the debtor and utilities.  In general, § 366,
former and modified, balances the interests of the debtor against those of the
utility companies.50  On the one hand, it ensures that a debtor is not deprived
of vital utility services during its post-bankruptcy proceedings.  At the same
time, however, it protects utility companies from involuntarily financing the
distressed debtor.
Former § 366(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic injunc-
tion on utilities.  In particular, utilities were not allowed to “alter, refuse, or
discontinue service to, or discriminate against . . . the debtor solely on the
basis of the commencement of [a bankruptcy proceeding] . . . or that a debt
owed by the debtor to such utility for service rendered before the order for
relief was not paid when due.”  Subsection (b) limited that automatic injunc-
tion by setting a twenty-day threshold.  Namely, a utility would have the
right to alter, refuse, or discontinue service if neither the trustee nor the
48Under new § 546(c), “. . .  a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course
of such seller’s business, [has the right] to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods while
insolvent, within 45 days before the date of the commencement of a case under this title, . . .”
49In re Dana Corporation, 367 B.R. 409, 415 n.5 (further citing to Charles J. Shaw & Brent Weisen-
berg, Effect of a Preexisting Security Interest in the Debtor’s Inventory on the Rights of Reclamation Credi-
tors, 2005 Norton Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law Part I § 15 (Sept. 2006)).
50The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “utility.”  However, according to the legislative
history, “. . . utilities have some special position with respect to the debtor, such as an electric company, a
gas supplier, or telephone company that is a monopoly in the area so that the debtor cannot easily obtain
comparable service from another utility.”  H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 350 (1977).  Bank-
ruptcy courts have been attempting ever since to define the term “utilities” relying on that legislative
history. See, e.g., In re Moorefield, 218 B.R. 795 (the court found that a cable television did not have
monopoly as a service provider); In re Good Time Charlie’s Ltd., 25 B.R. 226, 227 (“In the first place, we
note that Congress chose to use the term “utility” rather than “public utility” in § 366, thereby indicating
to us that an entity other than a public utility could be considered a utility for purposes of § 366.”).
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debtor furnished within twenty days adequate assurance of payment, in the
form of a deposit or other security, for service after such date.51
In practice, the debtor would file a first-day motion asking the bank-
ruptcy court to determine what would constitute adequate assurance pay-
ment in order for utilities to continue providing their services to the
distressed debtor during the Chapter 11 case.  The assurances offered would
usually be non-monetary, such as administrative priority and existence of
prepetition deposits.52  The debtor could also “use” to its benefit its consis-
tent and timely prepetition payment history.53  The logic behind that was
that if the debtor was making all payments in a timely manner pre-petition,
there was no reason why it would not continue doing so post-petition.54
Further, if the utility companies were not satisfied with the assurance pay-
ment, they could seek to modify it.
BAPCPA seems largely to tip the balance in favor of utilities by com-
pletely altering the pre-BAPCPA status quo.  Subsections (a) and (b) were
kept intact, but a new subsection (c) was added.  This new subsection, apply-
ing only to Chapter 11 cases, seems to increase the bargaining power of utili-
ties at the expense of the debtor’s reorganization efforts.55  In particular, it is
expressly defined for the first time in the Bankruptcy Code what constitutes
an “assurance payment.”  Contrary to the established pre-BAPCPA practice,
this definition is limited only to “cash-type” assurances,56 unless the parties
agree otherwise, and unequivocally excludes administrative expense prior-
ity.57  At the same time, subsection (c)(3)(A) provides that in determining
whether an assurance of payment is adequate, the court may not take into
consideration arguments that were traditionally part of a debtor’s relevant
motion in the pre-BAPCPA period.  In particular, the court may no longer
consider—
(i) the absence of security before the date of the filing of the petition;
5111 U.S.C. § 366(b) (prior to BAPCPA).
52Jeremy W. Ryan, Post-BAPCPA Approaches to § 366 Adequate Assurance Motions, ABI Telecom-
munications and Technology Committee Newsletter, Volume 4 Number 4/December 2007.
53Id.
54Kenneth M. Misken & Sarah B. Boehm, Utilities after BAPCPA: What’s Changed?, 26 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 36, 36 (Mar. 2007),
55See id. (stating that: “It could be safely assumed that utility providers were jumping for joy with the
enactment of § 366(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which easily could be read to put utility providers in the
driver’s seat when negotiating and determining adequate assurance of future payment.”).
56Indeed, under new § 366(c)(1)(A), “assurance of payment” can only be: a cash deposit, a letter of
credit, a certificate of deposit, a surety bond, a prepayment of utility consumption, or another form of
security that is mutually agreed on between the utility and the debtor or the trustee.  11 U.S.C. § 366.
See Peter S. Fishman, Not So Fast: Asset Sales under the New § 363, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 81 (Sept.
2005) (“essentially all ‘cashless’ forms of adequate assurance of post-petition utility payments have been
eliminated.”).
57§ 366 (c)(1)(B).
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(ii) the payment by the debtor of charges for utility service in a timely
manner before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(iii) the availability of an administrative expense priority.58
Subsection (c) goes further to provide that utilities may now “alter, refuse
or discontinue service, if during the 30-day period beginning on the date of
the filing of the petition, the utility does not receive from the debtor . . .
adequate assurance payment for utility service that is satisfactory to the util-
ity.”59  At first glance, it seems that utilities’ bargaining power is enhanced.
In the negotiations with the debtor, it is the utility that will determine the
amount of assurance payment that is deemed satisfactory.60  But does that,
also, mean that the debtor can now seek modification only after it has com-
plied with the utility’s demands?  This would imply that the debtor would
have to provide utilities with whatever amount they would request at the
outset of the case, thus diverting valuable reorganization resources in order to
ensure the uninterrupted continuation of their services.  This provision’s in-
terpretation has been the central issue of many post-BAPCPA holdings, with
the bankruptcy court in In re Lucre61 answering affirmatively.  There the
bankruptcy court stated that in light of this new subsection the debtor in
possession “has no recourse to modify the adequate assurance payment the
utility is demanding until the . . . debtor in possession actually accepts what
the utility proposes,”62 thereby declaring the end of traditional assurance-
payment first-day motions.63  This holding was highly criticized by the vast
majority of bankruptcy courts for thwarting the debtor’s reorganization ef-
forts.  As a result, courts deviated from the Lucre decision in an attempt to
preserve the pre-BAPCPA balance.  For example, the bankruptcy court in In
re Circuit, one of the biggest Chapter 11 liquidations of the last years, held
that such an interpretation of  § 366 could have dire consequences for the
debtor and that “Congress could not have intended to place in peril the entire
reorganization process.”64  The same court underlined the danger of utility
58§ 366(c)(3)(A).
5911 U.S.C. § 366(c)(2) (emphasis added).
60See, e.g., Bertrand Pan & Jennifer Taylor, Sustaining Power: Applying 11 U.S.C. § 366 in Chapter 11
Post-BAPCPA, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 371, 372 (commenting on this provision and stating that:
“[t]his provision appears to vest the utility provider with total discretion, effectively permitting the util-
ity to terminate the debtor’s service—and rehabilitation effort—at its will.  Such a result is entirely at
odds with the original purpose of §366”). See also William P. Weintraub, The Conundrum of New Bank-
ruptcy Code Section 366: To “b” or Not to “b,” That Is the Question, or By the “c,” by the “c,” by the
Beautiful “c”, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 Art. 1 (2007).
61333 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005).
62Id. at 154.
63Misken & Boehm, supra note 54, at 36.
64In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653, 2009 WL 484553, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2009)
(characterizing also “[s]uch an interpretation of §366 [as] simply unworkable” that “could lead to absurd
results”).
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companies’ relying on the Lucre interpretation of § 366 in order to exert
undue pressure on the debtor by making a demand only at the end of the 30-
day period and, thus, compelling it to either pay immediately what is de-
manded, or face the prospect of trying to reorganize without utility ser-
vices.65  Indeed, interpreting modified § 366 according to Lucre, debtors
would be at the disadvantageous bargaining position to negotiate with maybe
hundreds of utilities at the outset of the case, when there is neither time nor
cash.66
Even though the bankruptcy courts’ holdings have probably curtailed the
potential adverse impact of § 366 by at least allowing the debtors to seek
modification of the assurance payment before having to comply with the utili-
ties’ demands, the fact remains that debtors are now obliged to offer assur-
ances in the form of cash or cash equivalents.67  When the debtor has to deal
with many utility companies, which is usually the case with retailers, the
effects can be particularly adverse.  What we see then is the oxymoronic
phenomenon of a company depleted of cash that has yet to post cash deposits
all around the country using the scarce resources that would otherwise be
valuable to its reorganization efforts.  Combined with the credit crunch com-
panies were faced with during the 2008 recession, and could face again in the
future, it is obvious that constraints like this in the debtor’s liquidity could
prove fatal to its reorganization efforts.
iv. Landlords: Treatment of Commercial Leases (§ 365)
Another important change effectuated by BAPCPA relates to the treat-
ment of unexpired non-residential leases in which the debtor is the lessee and,
in particular, the conditions under which the debtor may assume, reject, or
assign them.  Commentators link the treatment of commercial leases post-
petition to the debtor’s ability to reorganize.  They argue that, especially in
the case of national chain retailers that operate throughout the country a
large number of stores, the debtor’s strategic decisions in this matter could
65Id. at *4. See also id. at *5 (“Without such Procedures, the Debtors could be forced to address
numerous requests by utility companies in an unorganized manner at a critical period in their efforts to
reorganize.”). See also In re Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., No. 11-CV-1338, 2011 WL 5546954
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011), *4 (the district court judge held that the bankruptcy court did not err in its
reading of § 366 and agreed that interpreting § 366 in light of the Lucre decision “would either potentially
place a debtor in a position where it would lose the Section 366 protections based on a utility provider’s
action or inaction, or it would hamstring the authority of the courts to set the amount of  adequate
assurance in the event that the parties could not reach an agreement on the matter”).
66Gerald H. Gline & Grant L. Cartwright, Section 366 (c) Does Not Require DIPs to Satisfy Adequate
Assurance Demands of Utilities, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 69 (Feb. 2012).
67Geida D. Sanlate, Tilting the Scale in Favor of Debtors in Light of BAPCA’s Amendment of Section
366, 4 RUTGERS BUS. L. J. 42, 61 (2007) (“Indeed, BAPCPA’s amendment enacting section 366 (c) ad-
versely affects Chapter 11 debtors’ ability to reorganize. In effect, the amended section 366 substantially
strengthens the ability of utility companies to demand cash deposits as adequate assurance of payment, or
in the alternative to more easily terminate service to the debtor.”).
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prove crucial to the success of its reorganization efforts.68
Former § 365(d)(4) provided that in order for the bankruptcy court to
grant extensions on top of the baseline period there had to be cause shown.
However, courts used to routinely grant extensions that too often allowed
debtors an indefinite period to decide whether they would assume or reject
their unexpired leases.69  The upside for the pre-BAPCPA debtor was that it
was afforded ample time to make an intelligent decision about which leases to
assume or reject based on which leases would enhance its profits and which
would only burden it with unnecessary costs.
However, the interests of the debtor are not the only ones at stake.
Landlords were being held hostage, usually for several years, until they
learned whether their leases would be assumed or rejected.  This waiting
period created “ghost-stores” that could, in turn, take down with them the
host shopping malls and deprive other financially sound retailers of valuable
locations.70  Naturally, landlords have always been lobbying for greater pro-
tection.  This attempt has been brought to fruition twice, the first being in
1984 with the so-called “Shopping Center Amendments.”71  It was then that
Congress set for the first time a sixty-day limitation from the filing of the case
for the debtor to assume or reject an unexpired lease and, additionally, gave
the landlords’ claims administrative priority status regardless of whether the
non-residential lease provided a benefit to the estate.72  However, landlords’
68See, e.g., Gregory G. Hesse, Issues in Commercial Leasing, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 189, 189 (“the
ability to reorganize may be closely linked with the trustee’s ability to minimize his lease expenses both
during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding and after confirmation.”); Jo Ann Brighton et al., For Better
Or Worse: Chapter 11 In The Post-BAPCPA Downturn (First Panel in the Symposium: Into the Sunset:
Bankruptcy as Scriptwriter of the De´nouement of Financial Distress), 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 555,
562 (2009) (“And I use Circuit City as an example because Circuit City’s unheard of in the sense that
because of these deadlines, they started a liquidation sale even before the Christmas season and normally
when you’re representing retailers, you always have that one more Christmas season that you want to get
through because everybody always thinks that’s going to be the season.”).
69See In re Wedtech Corp., 72 B.R. 464, 471-472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing different cases when
referring to the criteria used to examine whether an extension should be granted, noting in particular  the
following criteria used pre-BAPCPA: “(i) the lease is a primary asset and the ‘decision to assume or reject
the lease would be central to any plan of reorganization’ in the Chapter 11 proceeding . . . ; (ii) the landlord
has a reversionary interest in a building built by the tenant on the landlord’s land and the gaining of the
building would represent a windfall to the landlord . . . ; (iii) the debtor has not had the time necessary to
intelligently ‘ . . . appraise its financial situation and the potential value of its assets in terms of the
formulation of a plan . . .’ . . . ; and (iv) the existence of any other facts indicating the lack of a ‘reasonable
time to decide whether to assume or reject’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
70See Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 6 (opening statements of the Hon. Trent Franks).
71Section 365 was amended as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984.
72Up to then, the landlord would be afforded administrative priority only if the trustee actually occu-
pied the premises and was deriving a benefit from them. See, e.g., In re Bain, Inc., 554 F.2d 255, 256 (5th
Cir. 1977); In re Joseph C. Spiess Co., 145 B.R. 597, 607 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
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lobbying continued after that.  The result of their intensive effort was the
amendment of § 365 pursuant to BAPCPA in 2005.
New § 365(d)(4) extends the assumption/rejection period to 120 days
and provides for an initial ninety-day extension.73  Any other extension re-
quires the written consent of the lessor.74  This provision significantly en-
hances the landlords’ position as it gives them a veto right over the debtor’s
extension requests beyond the 210-day period.  New § 365(d)(4) stands in
stark contrast with standard practice under the old regime where the courts
would routinely grant extensions for the assumption or rejection of leases
without having to obtain the landlords’ consent.  Indeed, according to the
legislative history, § 365 was amended in order to “remove the bankruptcy
judge’s discretion to grant extensions of the time for the retail debtor to
decide whether to assume or reject a lease after a maximum possible period of
210 days . . . “ beyond which “the judge has no authority to grant further
time unless the lessor has agreed in writing to the extension.”75
However, one cannot ignore that this shortened time-window can push
debtors to reach hasty and inefficient decisions, especially when they have to
decide for thousands of stores that they may be operating across the country.
This danger was stressed in the testimony of Isaac Pachulski, representing
the National Bankruptcy Conference, before the Subcommittee on Commer-
cial and Administrative Law on the issue of Circuit City Chapter 11 liquida-
tion.  In this testimony he underlined the fact that the debtor will most likely
not be able to make an informed decision location by location within the new
time limits set by BAPCPA.  Indeed, he notes, if a retailer debtor files a
Chapter 11 case, for example, before the end of May, “it will have to decide
whether to assume or reject its leases before it even knows the results of the
holiday season, before it has any realistic opportunity to determine whether
particular locations work or don’t work.”76
It should be noted, however, that Congress has attempted to strike a
balance by capping the amount owed to the landlord if a lease is assumed and
subsequently rejected.  Prior to BAPCPA, landlords were entitled to an ad-
ministrative claim in the amount of the rent owed for the balance of the term.
This created a burdensome administrative expense that deprived debtors of
funds vital to their reorganization efforts or funds that could be distributed to
7311 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(A), (B) (i).
7411 U.S.C. § 365 (d)(4)(B)(ii).
75H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 86-87, reprinted in 2005 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 152-153.
76Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 6 (testimony of Isaac Pachulski) (Pachulski continues arguing
that the 210-day cap period “creates an impetus for secured lenders to push for liquidation.  Because if you
are a lender with a lien on inventory, you know that if the inventory is not liquidated in place, if you have
to move it and sell it at a warehouse, you will get substantially less.  So what you have in the back of your
mind is: You have got a 210-day limit.  And if the liquidation is going to occur, it better occur before
then.”).
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their unsecured creditors.77  Post-BAPCPA, landlords are limited to an ad-
ministrative claim for “a sum equal to all monetary obligations due, . . . , for
the period of 2 years following the later of the rejection date or date of actual
turnover of the premises . . .”78 However, it is doubtful that this favorable
provision will have any positive effect in practice.  Premature assumptions of
leases can lead to an increasing number of subsequent rejections compared to
the pre-BAPCPA period, thus raising the administrative claims amount to
pre-BAPCPA limits.  Coupled with § 503(b)(9), which (as noted above) adds
to administrative expenses certain claims of sellers of goods, it does not seem
likely that the landlords’ administrative expense limitation will contribute
substantively to the debtor’s liquidity.
Additionally, new § 365 reduces cash infusions to the debtor by altering
the landscape in the “designation rights industry,” which is where the debtor
can sell its right to assign a lease. In particular, the buyer of the assignment
right will be empowered to direct the debtor to assume and assign the lease
to a third party that the buyer will have located.79  It follows, then, that
three are the main parties involved in such sales: the buyer of the assignment
right, the assignee to whom the lease will be typically assigned for a year,80
and of course the debtor-seller of the right.81  This industry was created by
the option that the Bankruptcy Code gives debtors to override anti-assign-
ment clauses in lease contracts.82  As the bankruptcy court stated in In re
Ames Dept. Store, Inc., § 365(f) “performs an important function for maximiz-
ing the value in an estate of creditors.”83  “It protects,” the court continues,
“the body of creditors as a whole from provisions, typically in leases, that
77Steven E. Ostrow, What you Need to Know about the Treatment of Commercial Leases under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 22 No. 1 Prac. Real Est. Law 27 (2006).
7811 U.S.C. § 503(b)(7).
79See Susan G.Talley & Harris Ominsky, Assignments of Retail Leases in Bankruptcy, Part 2—On the
Right Track?, 19-APR PROB. & PROP. 42 (2005).
80James S. Carr And Robert L. Lehane, Gaining Ground: The Landlord Perspective On Retail Bank-
ruptcy Cases In The Wake Of The 2005 Bankruptcy Code Amendments, Practicing Law Institute, Real
Estate Law and Practice Court Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 8781, 965, 976-978 (October-December
2006).  See also In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 287 B.R. 112, 114 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (where the
court briefly describes the way the designation rights industry operates).
81It should be noted however that post-BAPCPA a fourth constituent, that of landlords is added.
Indeed, usually, designation-rights sales cannot be completed within the seven-month period set forth by
new § 365.  Since securing another extension requires the landlord’s written consent, it follows that the
latter has to be included in the negotiations. See Robert N. H. Christmas, Designation Rights—A New
Post-BAPCPA World, American Bankruptcy Institute (February 1, 2006) (“the era of retail debtors’ use
of unilateral omnibus motions to assume and assign leases . . . , seeking to “steamroller” undesirable lease
provisions and landlord opposition, is a thing of the past.”), available at http://www.abiworld.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=42452&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
8211 U.S.C. §365(f)(1) (“notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or
lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.”).
83316 B.R. 772, 795 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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frustrate the estate’s ability to convert the economic value in leases into cash
that can increase creditor recoveries.”84
The debtor’s right to sell these lease-assignment rights is mainly premised
on § 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, under which “[t]he trustee, after
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course
of business, property of the estate . . .”  Distressed firms can sell their right to
designate a proposed assignee, achieving a twofold benefit: shifting the carry-
ing costs of the lease to the buyer while obtaining immediate liquidity.  The
210-day cap, however, makes the purchase of such rights less appealing to the
buyer who now, in order to make a profit, must quickly market the lease and
find an assignee.  Indeed, a designation-rights sale will usually not be com-
pleted during the debtor’s seven-month period to assume or reject the lease.
It follows that fewer buyers will be willing to purchase such rights since
their chance for profit is largely decreased.  As a consequence, it is likely that
lease-assignment rights will be sold more cheaply now compared to the pre-
BAPCPA period, depressing both the debtor’s liquidity and creditors’
recoveries.85
v. Making Conversions and Dismissals Easier for Creditors to Win
(§ 1112)
Finally, the 2005 amendments have made it easier for creditors to achieve
conversion or dismissal of the Chapter 11 case.  In particular, prior to 2005,
§ 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code provided that if certain criteria were met,
the bankruptcy court had discretionary authority to convert or dismiss a
Chapter 11 case.  The 2005 amendments modified § 1112 by greatly limiting
this discretion of the court.86 In particular, under the modified § 1112, “on
request of a party in interest, and after a notice and a hearing, the court shall
convert . . . or dismiss . . . , for cause . . . “87 unless “the court finds and
specifically identifies unusual circumstances establishing that converting or
dismissing the case is not in the best interests of the creditor and the es-
84Id.
85See Pamela Holleman, Statutory Construction under BAPCPA, American Bankruptcy Institute,
13th Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 15-16 n.46 (July 2006), available at http://www.sandw
.com/assets/htmldocuments/Statutory%20Construction%20under%20BAPCPA%20b0544174.pdf (cit-
ing to Rafael Klotz, BAPCPA’s Impact on 363 Sales under the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Court Prac-
tice 2006 16th Annual Bench Meets Bar Conference, Boston Bar Association (May 17, 2006)). But see In
re Eastman Kodak Company, 495 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Judge Gropper decided in a case of first
impression that assignment of a lease can occur outside the deadline for assumption set forth by
§ 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Undoubtedly, this decision affords debtor with greater flexibility.).
86See, e.g., Cho, supra note 37, at 81; Nichole Wong, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Under The Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: The Need For Big Brother, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 237,
266 (2007).
8711 U.S.C. § 1121 (b)(1) (emphasis added).
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tate.”88  As a result, creditors can now exert more pressure on the debtor by
threatening to make a motion to convert or dismiss the Chapter 11 case.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The past few years have seen an increase in empirical studies of business
bankruptcies within the Chapter 11 forum.  Several scholarly articles have
attempted to establish and quantify causal relationships between various
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors and Chapter 11 outcomes.  How-
ever, until now there has been no empirical study taking into consideration
the effect that the 2005 amendments might have had on the Chapter 11
landscape.
Dahiya et al. examine the effect that DIP financing has on the bankruptcy
process.89  Testing a sample of 548 firms that filed for Chapter 11 between
January 1988 and December 1997,90 they find that DIP financing leads to
positive net present value projects that increase the likelihood of a successful
reorganization.  The theoretical argument behind this is that DIP lenders per-
form both a screening and monitoring role that allows them to identify which
of the distressed firms are more likely to emerge quickly, and in fact help
these firms emerge quickly.  The results of the study indicate that DIP fi-
nancing is also associated with reduced time in bankruptcy, especially when
the DIP financier is a pre-existing lender.
Similarly, Carapeto examined a sample of large U.S. firms that filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1986 and 1997.91  The sample is further
divided into firms that did and did not obtain DIP financing.  The results of
her study suggest, among other things, that DIP financing is associated with a
greater likelihood of a successful reorganization.92
Abraham and Habbu study how the tightening of DIP financing in the
post-recession era has affected bankruptcy outcomes.93  Marking as the start-
ing point of the financial recession the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, they
compare pre-crisis and post-crisis datasets consisting of firms with at least
$100 million in debt that were able to secure post-petition financing.94  The
study indicates that post-crisis firms obtained DIP financing with higher in-
terest rates.  At the same time there was a statistically significant increase in
8811 U.S.C. § 1121 (b)(2).
89Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evi-
dence, Journal of Financial Economics 69.1 (2003): 259-80.
90Financial services firms were excluded as well as six Chapter 11 cases that involved tort claimants.
91Maria Carapeto, Does Debtor-In-Possession Financing Add Value? (October 6, 2003) (unpublished
working paper, City University London).
92Id. at 21.
93Nikhil Abraham & Aditya Habbu, DIP Lending and the Death of Emergence: Reorganization Out-
comes Post-Crisis, International Corporate Rescue, Vol. 8, Issue 4 (2011).
94Id.
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the number of sales as well as in private-equity fund involvement in the DIP
process.  Based on these findings, the authors argue that DIP loans have
stopped serving their traditional goal of allowing a firm to emerge from bank-
ruptcy, and instead are used as a path to sale.
Finally, Ayotte and Morrison examined the effect of creditor control and
conflict on Chapter 11 outcomes by examining a sample of 153 large Chapter
11 cases filed in the latter half of 2001.95  They found evidence that creditors
rather than debtors are in control of the Chapter 11 case, and they identify a
new conflict that can distort the reorganization process: conflict between se-
nior and junior classes of debt.  The results of their study indicate a statisti-
cally significant, non-monotonic relationship between the ratio of secured
debt-to-assets and the bankruptcy outcome.  In particular, the data show that
a pre-plan sale is more likely when creditors are over-secured, and corre-
spondingly less likely among firms with under-secured lenders.  Reorganiza-
tion is also more likely in cases where there is no secured debt, since
unsecured creditors will favor lengthy proceedings in an attempt to increase
their recoveries.
The present study aims to shed light on the effect that the 2005 amend-
ments had on Chapter 11 practice.  To this end, and as described in the
following section, a multivariate logistic regression model is employed.
III. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
A. BAPCPA’S EFFECTS ON THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY LANDSCAPE
i. Hypothesis
BAPCPA changed the Chapter 11 landscape by taking privileges away
from the debtor, depleting it of cash, shortening its timeframe for making
strategic decisions, and enhancing creditors’ rights and control over the case.
Starting, therefore, from the hypothesis that the 2005 amendments have
made bankruptcy more difficult and burdensome for the debtor, I predict that
BAPCPA has increased the proportion of Chapter 11 cases that are disposed
of rapidly.  Indeed, it seems that the post-2005 debtor has less time and
money than the pre-2005 debtor and, therefore, is less likely to undergo a full-
blown Chapter 11 case.  Given the increased likelihood of administrative in-
solvency at an early stage of the Chapter 11 filing, it is likely that debtors
will not waste time in negotiating with their creditors to write down debt,
but they will instead seek a strategic buyer at the outset of the case, or
liquidate rapidly within Chapter 11.  As a result, we expect to see a rise in
§ 363 sales of all or substantially all debtor assets, either piecemeal or as a
95Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, Columbia
University Center for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 321.
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going concern.  Indeed, a great advantage of such pre-plan sales is that they
offer the debtor the opportunity to exit the Chapter 11 case within a few
months of the filing date.  Furthermore, and according to what is widely
maintained, we expect to see a decrease in the proportion of firms that
emerge from Chapter 11.
An alternative theory, however, would be that the bankruptcy courts’
attempts to strike a better balance between creditors’ and debtors’ interests
by interpreting the new provisions in a light favorable to the debtor have
mitigated BAPCPA’s effects on the Chapter 11 landscape.  Additionally, it
could be the case that debtors and the non-debtor parties, exactly because of
the shorter timeframes and liquidity constraints that BAPCPA imposes, will
tend to engage in extensive pre-bankruptcy strategic planning, thus increasing
the chances for a traditional reorganization.  Indeed, it seems that the propor-
tion of pre-negotiated and prepackaged bankruptcies has almost doubled com-
pared to the pre-BAPCPA period, as shown in Figure 1.
ii. Sample Selection
The first study focuses on large publicly traded corporations that filed for
Chapter 11 between 1997 and 2011.  The sample of firms with these charac-
teristics was drawn from Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database
(“BRD”),96 yielding a total of 680 filings.  Repeat filings are treated as sepa-
rate filings.  Professor LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database includes fi-
nancial and other data for public debtor-companies with assets of $100
million or more, measured in 1980 dollars, as of the last 10-K filed prior to
bankruptcy.97  I identified the industry of the debtors by the SIC Division98
in which they are classified, and excluded those under Division H, namely
finance, insurance, and real estate companies.99  Finance and insurance compa-
nies differ from other firms because they are subject to special regulations and
follow different accounting rules.  Consequently, the initial sample was re-
duced to 604 corporations.  For this sample of 604 corporations, balance-
sheet and income-statement financial data were gathered for the fiscal year in
which the firms filed for bankruptcy and for up to two preceding fiscal years.
The source of these financial data was Compustat.100  Other necessary non-
96Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.
97See Protocols for the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, available at http://lopucki.law
.ucla.edu/.  Additionally, in order for a firm of this size to be included in Professor LoPucki’s database, it
should have submitted annual report filings (Form 10-K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission for
a year ending not less than three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case.
98SIC is an acronym for Standard Industrial Classification, a system that classifies industries by a four-
digit code (http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html).
99Division H is further divided into seven major groups: 1) depository institutions, 2) non-depository
credit institutions, 3) security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges and services, 4) insurance carri-
ers, 5) insurance agents, brokers and service, 6) real estate, and 7) holding and other investment offices.
100Compustat is a database that contains financial data for a vast number of companies worldwide.
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financial data were drawn from the Bankruptcy DataSource,101 press releases,
and news articles.  Data were fully available for 506 companies, the sample
studied.
Tables 1 and 2 give summary descriptive statistics for the sample. Manu-
facturing firms consist of 36% of the total firms, and thus dominate the sam-
ple.  Transportation, communications, electric, and gas firms follow with
22%, while services firms account for 18% of the total companies. .  Retailers
comprise 12% of the sample.102  The sample is also divided by possible Chap-
ter 11 outcomes as follows: a) “§ 363 Sales” including both piecemeal and
going-concern pre-plan sales, b) traditional reorganizations, namely Chapter
11 cases in which the debtor-firm negotiated with its creditors, wrote down
debt, and emerged from bankruptcy as a stand-alone company, c) asset sales
pursuant to a plan, d) liquidating plans, e) mergers, and f) conversions/dismis-
sals.103  Firms that underwent a § 363 sale seem less leveraged than those
that did not.
Figures 2 and 3 show the raw number of § 363 sales for each of the years
examined by year of case filing and the percentage of § 363 sales in relation
to the total Chapter 11 cases that were completed (by any means, including a
confirmed plan, sale, dismissal or conversion).  The number of Chapter 11
filings is larger during and near periods marked as recessions, as shown in
Figure 2.  Indeed, in the pre-BAPCPA period we observe an increase in
Chapter 11 filings around the 2001 recession period.  Similarly, in the post-
BAPCPA era, Chapter 11 filings show a steep rise in 2009.
iii. Regression Models and Variable Selection
The purpose of the first study is to examine and quantify the specific
impact of BAPCPA on rapid Chapter 11 dispositions effectuated through the
use of § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The dataset indicates that the per-
centage of § 363 sales largely increased after the enactment of the 2005
amendments.104  This increase was measured to be statistically significant at
1% level.105  In order to reach accurate results, however, the impact of other
factors potentially affecting the outcome should be simultaneously examined,
as this percentage discrepancy could be the result of other macroeconomic or
microeconomic conditions.  Periods of economic recession as well as the firms’
financial strength as reflected in leverage and liquidity levels could influence
Chapter 11 outcomes.  For example, the company’s level of debt as well as its
101Bankruptcy DataSource covers public companies that are in bankruptcy and contains, among other
things, company profiles and reorganization plans.
102See infra Table 1.
103See infra Table 2.
104See infra Figure 4.
105Double-sided univariate test calculating the p-value for t-test for difference in percentages found
that this increase was statistically significant at 1% level.
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ability to satisfy its current liabilities when they come due or quickly turn
assets into cash could affect whether the firm will have the chance to go
through a full-blown Chapter 11 proceeding or instead be disposed rapidly.
In order, therefore, to measure more accurately BAPCPA’s effect on § 363
sales and test whether this effect could be adequately described by other
factors, a multivariate logistic regression framework is used.  The set of vari-
ables is briefly described below.
The dependent variable in this model is “§ 363 sales.” It includes all cases
in which there was a pre-plan sale of all or substantially all assets. These
outcomes are coded as 1.  Any other Chapter 11 outcome is coded as 0.
The following seven independent variables were identified as potentially
affecting Chapter 11 outcomes.  These are financial ratios that measure the
strength of the company as close as possible to the bankruptcy filing.  Finan-
cial data to calculate these ratios were drawn from Compustat and corre-
spond to either the 10-K filed during bankruptcy or the 10-K filed for the last
fiscal year before bankruptcy.  If such data were not available, the ratios cor-
respond to the financial data included in the 10-K filed for the second-to-last
fiscal year before bankruptcy.  “Total assets” are reported on a book value
basis.
The first ratio used is a leverage ratio.  In particular, the following ratio
was considered:
• Long-Term Secured Debt106 / Total Debt107
A liquidity ratio measuring the company’s ability to satisfy its short-term
obligations by either using cash or turning short-term assets into cash was
also added.  In particular, the following liquidity ratio was used:
• Current Assets108 / Total Assets
A ratio measuring the firm’s financial strength and profitability was also
taken into account:
• EBITDA / Total Assets
The size of the distressed firm might also affect its Chapter 11 outcome.
To this end, I included in the logistic regression a relevant variable.  In partic-
ular, and similarly with Dahiya et al.,109 I used as a proxy of the firm’s size the
logarithm of the book value of the company’s total assets.
• Firm Size—the logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets as
106Based on Compustat’s definition, “secured debt” represents all long-term debt secured or collateral-
ized by mortgage, property, receivables, stock or other assets.
107Compustat does not contain a “total debt” item. In order, therefore, to calculate “total debt”, Com-
pustat’s item “debt in current liabilities” was added to its “long-term debt” item.
108Otherwise known as “current ratio.”  Specifically, Compustat defines “current assets” as represent-
ing cash and other assets that are expected to be realized in cash or used in the production of revenue
within the next 12 months.
109Supra note 89.
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reported for the fiscal year of the bankruptcy filing event or for up to
two preceding fiscal years.
The categorical variables of “BAPCPA” and “economic recession” were
added and coded as follows:
• BAPCPA: a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation filed
for Chapter 11 on or after October 17th, 2005.  For debtors that filed
before this date, this variable takes the value 0.
• Economic Recession: a binary variable for the periods of economic re-
cession in the United States as measured by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER).110  According to the NBER, contractions
start at the peak of the business cycle and end at the trough.  Based on
this definition, this binary variable takes the value of 1 if firms filed for
Chapter 11 within a recession; otherwise the value is 0.  In the present
sample, two sets of firms fall within periods of economic recession:
those that filed between March 2001 and November 2001, and those
that filed between December 2007 and June 2009.
Finally, the macroeconomic variable of GDP was added:
• GDP (annual percentage growth rate)
The second study aims to examine whether the enactment of the 2005
amendments has lowered the rate of debtor emergences.  To this end, a mul-
tivariate regression model is once again employed.
This time the dependent variable is “non-emergence.”  It includes all
Chapter 11 cases from which the debtor did not emerge.  In particular, fol-
lowing BRD’s codification, a debtor did not emerge if no operating company
exited bankruptcy or if the case was converted to Chapter 7.  Furthermore,
the debtor did not emerge if, in case of an acquisition or merger, its assets
were merely incorporated into an existing business of the acquirer or merger
partner.111  On the contrary, a debtor did emerge even if acquired by another
company provided that the acquirer operated the debtor as a separate busi-
ness.112  A company also emerged if a plan of reorganization was confirmed.
“Non-emergence” outcomes are coded as 1, and “emergence” outcomes as 0.
The same independent variables identified above are again used.
iv. Results
Quantifying BAPCPA’s effect on § 363 sales of the debtor’s all or sub-
stantially all assets would be a first step towards understanding the extent to
which the 2005 amendments have helped change the Chapter 11 landscape.
110National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), http://www.nber.org/.
111Unless the merger partner was small in relation to the debtor.
112See BRD‘s Protocols where it is also stated that a company emerges only if, at the time of the
relevant order (confirmation or sale), the company was operating and had the intent to continue to operate
indefinitely.
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Table 3 quantifies the effect of BAPCPA on such rapid dispositions and dis-
plays the results of the multivariate logistic regression.
Initially, we observe that the constant term is negative as expected and in
accordance with the fact that the majority of companies did not undergo
§ 363 sales.  At this point, however, it should be noted that the number of
companies that underwent § 363 sales is understated because it does not take
into account cases in which the distressed firm, in the course of the Chapter
11 process, sold assets that constituted a majority of a firm’s value but did
not reach the point to qualify as “substantially all.”  Furthermore, the sign of
the EBITDA-to-total assets ratio’s coefficient is negative, indicating that the
stronger a company is, the less likely it is to be forced to a § 363 sale.  The
same holds for larger companies, as the “firm size” variable indicates.  Addi-
tionally, the coefficient of the leverage ratio considered, namely that of se-
cured debt-to-total debt, is positive indicating that there is greater
probability for firms with higher levels of secured debt to be led to a swift
§ 363 sale.
BAPCPA, the variable that is of main concern here, is positively corre-
lated with § 363 sales with a p-value113 of 2% even when accounting for
other microeconomic and macroeconomic factors.  Therefore, and as the
dataset initially suggested, the 2005 amendments have contributed to the
large increase of rapid dispositions through the form of pre-plan sales of all or
substantially all debtor assets.  It seems that as BAPCPA has shortened the
timeframe within which strategic decisions can be made and has imposed
additional liquidity constraints, the debtor, fearing that it will not be able to
survive a full-blown Chapter 11 case, resorts to swift sales of all or substan-
tially all assets.  This increase in the proportion of § 363 sales may also ex-
plain a result that is contrary to what we expected: the lower rate of
conversions in the post-BAPCPA period.  Indeed, since the hypothesis is that
the 2005 amendments increased the costs of bankruptcy and made the confir-
mation of a plan less likely, we would expect a higher rate of conversions in
the post-BAPCPA period.  Not only that, but, as mentioned under Part I,
the amendments themselves seem to favor conversions and dismissals by mak-
ing it easier for creditors to win such motions.  It is, therefore, likely that the
aforementioned rise in the proportion of § 363 sales indicates that bank-
ruptcy courts are increasingly comfortable in using § 363(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code as a liquidation vehicle, dispensing with the need to convert to a
Chapter 7 case.
113In hypothesis testing the p-value is the probability of getting a test statistic equal to or more
extreme than the sample result given that the null hypothesis is true.  In regression specifically, the null
hypothesis is that a coefficient is equal to 0.  Therefore, the p-value quantifies the probability that the
association between the dependent and the independent variable, indicated by a coefficient that is different
from 0, is real and not due to chance.
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In order to conduct robustness checks, I ran the regression model multiple
times using a different combination of independent variables.  While most
other factors fluctuated, both in terms of directionality and p-values,
BAPCPA was always positively correlated to § 363 sales and statistically
significant at either 1% or 5% level.114
But has BAPCPA adversely affected the probability of debtor emer-
gences, as its opponents allege?  Table 4 displays the results of the mul-
tivariate logistic regression.  First and foremost we observe that BAPCPA is
not statistically significant.  In fact, the data show that BAPCPA had had no
statistically significant effect on the debtor’s likelihood of emergence.  What
instead seems to have a strong effect on emergences is recessions: the reces-
sion variable is positively correlated with Chapter 11 liquidations at a statis-
tically significant level of 5%.115  Furthermore, we observe that the larger the
company is the less likely it is to liquidate.  This is consistent with the find-
ings of Dahiya et al.  In particular, assuming that the asset size can be used as
an indicator of available collateral, Dahiya finds that larger firms are better
able to secure DIP financing, and thus constitute more likely candidates for
emergence.116
The results of these studies indicate that, contrary to what its opponents
maintain, BAPCPA did not increase the proportion of distressed firms that
do not emerge from their Chapter 11 filing.  What BAPCPA did, however,
was to change traditional bankruptcy practice by encouraging fast-track pre-
plan sales of all or substantially all debtor assets.
The following section examines whether the same conclusions hold for
retailers, the group that has allegedly been the biggest victim of the 2005
amendments.
B. THE SPECIFIC CASE OF RETAILERS
i. Hypothesis
The group of firms that due to its inherent characteristics is assumed to
be most heavily stricken by the 2005 amendments are retailers.  As men-
tioned in Part I, BAPCPA reduces the period within which a debtor can
decide whether to assume or reject leases.  This can be specifically harmful
114For example, I re-ran the regression using a different combination of liquidity ratios.  In all cases,
BAPCPA remained statistically significant at either 1% or 5% level.  Furthermore, additional
macroeconomic factors were taken into account.  In place of the economic recession variable included in
the previous regression model, the risk-lending premium variable was added.  The risk-lending premium
was calculated as the difference between the prime rate and the yield on short-term (one year) treasury
bonds.  The prime rate data were gathered from the WSJ Prime Interest Rate History.  Historical treasury
bond yields were drawn from the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  BAPCPA was statistically signifi-
cant at 1% level.
115Its p-value is 2%.
116Supra note 89.
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for retailers that operate thousands of stores nationwide since they cannot
quickly make an intelligent decision on which leases are best to assume or
reject.  At the same time, vendors of goods, with whom retailers are in a
symbiotic relationship, are elevated to administrative creditor status for some
pre-petition deliveries, strongly increasing the probability that the debtor
will become administratively insolvent at an early stage of the case.  It is for
these reasons that BAPCPA has been blamed, almost exclusively, for the
alleged increasing proportion of distressed retail firms that end up being liqui-
dated in Chapter 11.  Notably, and as mentioned above, the 2009 liquidation
of Circuit City was the subject of a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the House of Representatives.117
Many scholars and practitioners arguing before this Committee, maintained
that BAPCPA’s amendments have made it especially difficult for retailers to
reorganize, leaving them with no option but fast-track liquidating sales with
the attendant loss of thousands of jobs.  Even though more research is neces-
sary, at this point it should be noted that as a general matter, it seems that,
compared to companies from other sectors, bankrupt retailers are less likely
to emerge.  Indeed, a bankruptcy case study of 86 business debtors that was
conducted by Fitch showed that the vast majority of the identified liquida-
tion outcomes involved retailers.  In particular, of these 86 cases, 14 resulted
in liquidations, 11 of which were liquidations of retailers.118
This study will examine whether the 2005 amendments pushed retailers
to fast-track dispositions, namely pre-plan sales of all or substantially all as-
sets, and whether they have adversely affected retailer-debtor emergences.
The hypothesis is that post-2005 fewer retailers will be able to undergo a
full-blown Chapter 11 reorganization. Instead, more of them will either rap-
idly liquidate within Chapter 11 or attempt to sell themselves as going con-
cerns.  Additionally, we would expect to observe a statistically significant
correlation effect of the 2005 amendments on the decreasing proportion of
retailers that emerge from Chapter 11.
ii. Sample Selection
This study focuses specifically on retailers, namely companies with a four-
digit SIC code119 ranging from 5200 to 5960, that filed for Chapter 11 be-
tween 1990 and 2012.  Our sample was drawn from the SDC Platinum
database, in particular its Corporate Restructuring component, which yielded
a total of 387 filings.  This database provides a basic financial profile of all
117See Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 6.
118Fitch: Mixed Recoveries for Creditors in U.S. Retail Bankruptcies (a summary of this report is
available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130416006123/en/Fitch-Mixed-Recoveries-
Creditors-U.S.-Retail-Bankruptcies) (the full report is available at www.fitchratings.com).
119As described above, supra note 98, SIC is an acronym for Standard Industrial Classification, a
system that classifies industries by a four-digit code (http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html).
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U.S. companies with more that $10 million in assets that have filed for Chap-
ter 11.  Repeat filings are treated as separate filings.
Once the sample of retailers was drawn, the next step was to identify the
disposition for each of the 387 cases.  For companies with more than 50 mil-
lion in assets, our main source for dispositions was the Bankruptcy
DataSource.  The Bankruptcy Datasource includes summaries of plans of re-
organizations as well as news articles and press releases relating to any debtor
that meets the aforementioned asset threshold.  Examining the plan summa-
ries, news articles, and press releases for each of the debtors I was able to
identify the corresponding dispositions, i.e. whether a plan of reorganization
was confirmed or the case was converted or dismissed, and whether the
debtor underwent a piecemeal or going-concern pre-plan sale of all or sub-
stantially all assets.  For debtors that did not meet the $50 million-asset
threshold I resorted to public filings, namely, 10-Ks and 8-Ks, as well as to
news articles and press releases.  From all sources, I was able to identify
Chapter 11 outcomes in 376 out of the total of 387 cases. For further infor-
mation relating to § 363 sales, e.g., date of announcement or closure of the
deal, identity of the acquirer, etc., I used the Mergerstat M&A database.
Mergerstat provides information on mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures
that have been publicly announced.
Figures 5 and 6 show the yearly proportion of § 363 sales of all or sub-
stantially all assets relative to total Chapter 11 filings.  In Figure 5 we clearly
see an increase in the proportion of § 363 sales over the years.120  Figure 6
displays § 363 sales of all or substantially all assets as a percentage of all
completed cases for the periods before and after the enactment of BAPCPA.
We observe that post-2005 the proportion of § 363 sales almost doubled, and
the increase was measured to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
These initial results are consistent with the hypothesis that confirmation
of a plan of reorganization is more difficult for retailers in the post-BAPCPA
era.  However, in order to reach accurate conclusions we should take into
account other financial and macroeconomic factors that might affect Chapter
11 outcomes.  To this end, balance sheet and income statement financial data,
as well as other macroeconomic data, were gathered for the sample of 376
firms for which the form of disposition could be identified.  All necessary
financial data were drawn from SDC Platinum and correspond to either the
year of bankruptcy or the last year before bankruptcy.  If such data were not
available, the ratios were calculated using financial data for the second year
before bankruptcy.  “Total assets” are reported on a book value basis.  Table
5 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of firms for which financial
data were available.
120The slope for the § 363 sales rate line is positive: 0.01829816.
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iii. Regression Models and Variable Selection
The study of retailers aims to examine and quantify the specific impact of
BAPCPA on retail Chapter 11 cases.  As mentioned in the Sample Selection
section, I find a statistically significant increase in § 363 sales in the post-
BAPCPA period.  In order to verify these results, however, the impact of
other, microeconomic or macroeconomic, factors potentially affecting the out-
come should be simultaneously examined.  Therefore, in order to measure
more accurately BAPCPA’s effect on pre-plan dispositions and test whether
this effect could be adequately described by other factors, a multivariate lo-
gistic regression framework is used.  The set of variables is briefly described
below.
Once again, the dependent variable in the present model is “§ 363 sales.”
It includes all cases in which there was a pre-plan sale of all or substantially
all debtor assets.  These outcomes are coded as 1.  Any other Chapter 11
outcome is coded as 0.
The following five independent variables were included in the regression
model as potentially having an impact on Chapter 11 outcomes.  These are
financial ratios that measure the strength of the company close to its bank-
ruptcy filing.  Financial data to calculate these ratios were drawn from SDC
Platinum and correspond, in order of preference, to either the year of bank-
ruptcy or the last year before bankruptcy.  If such data were not available,
the ratios correspond to the financial data available for the second-t year
before bankruptcy.  “Total assets” are reported on a book value basis.
Macroeconomic variables were also taken into account.
Once again, the logarithm of the book value of the firms’ “total assets”
item is used as a measure of their size.  The following variable was, therefore,
included in the regression model:
• Firm Size—the logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets as
reported for the filing year or the first or second preceding year.
The following leverage ratio was also included:
• Total Liabilities / Total Assets
The categorical variables of “BAPCPA” and “economic recession” were
added and coded as follows:
• BAPCPA: a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation filed
for Chapter 11 on or after October 17, 2005.  For debtors that filed
before this date, this variable takes the value 0.
• Economic Recession: a binary variable for the periods of economic re-
cession in the United States as defined by the NBER.121  As previ-
ously, this binary variable takes the value of 1 if firms filed for Chapter
11 within a recession; otherwise the value is 0.  In the retailers sample,
121National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): http://www.nber.org/.
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three sets of firms fall within periods of economic recession: those that
filed between July 1990 and March 1991; those that filed between
March 2001 and November 2001; and those that filed between Decem-
ber 2007 and June 2009.
Finally, as before, the following macroeconomic variable was used:
• GDP
The next step will be to examine and quantify the relationship between
the enactment of the 2005 amendments and the alleged decreasing rate of
retailer-debtor emergences.  To this end, a multivariate regression model is
once again employed.
The dependent variable is “non-emergence,” and it includes all Chapter
11 cases from which the debtor did not emerge.  Similarly with before, and
following the same reasoning with the BRD codification for the main sam-
ple,122 a debtor is considered not to have emerged if no operating company
exited bankruptcy.  Conversions to Chapter 7 are also treated as non-emer-
gences.  Furthermore, the debtor did not emerge if, in case of an acquisition or
merger, its assets were merely incorporated into an existing business of the
acquirer or merger partner.  However, a debtor did emerge if a successful
reorganization plan implementing a restructuring of debts and obligations was
confirmed, or if the debtor was acquired by another company that operated
the debtor as a separate business.123  “Non-emergence” outcomes are coded as
1, and “emergence” outcomes as 0.  The same independent variables men-
tioned above were included in the regression model.  Data on the debtor’s
emergence were gathered from the Bankruptcy Database, which provides,
among other things, summary reorganization plans.  Press releases and news
articles were also used.
iv. Results
Quantifying BAPCPA’s effect on pre-plan sales of distressed retail firms
would help answer whether the 2005 amendments have put retail debtor
Chapter 11 cases on the fast track.  Table 6 displays the results of the mul-
tivariate logistic regression.
BAPCPA, the variable that is of main concern here, is statistically signifi-
cant at 5% level, with a p-value of 4%.  This suggests that the 2005 amend-
ments have indeed made it more difficult for the retailer-debtor to remain
within the Chapter 11 proceeding.  Instead, it seems that post-2005 the re-
tailer-debtor is forced to resort to a rapid disposition of the case through an
early-stage sale or liquidation of the firm.  As mentioned under Part I, dis-
tressed retailers now have less time to make intelligent strategic decisions,
especially when it comes to which leases they should assume or reject.  Be-
122See supra Part III, section A, iii “Regression Models and Variable Selection”.
123See BRD‘s Protocols.
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cause of this tightened timeframe, lenders are eager to conduct, if necessary,
going-out-of business sales within the brief 210-day period in order to ensure
that the inventory will be marketed in the debtor’s store locations.  Further-
more, the elevation of trade creditors to administrative status and the expan-
sion of the reclamation right hurt the chances of traditional reorganization by
depleting the debtor of cash and leading to an early-stage administrative in-
solvency, leaving it with little option other than to engage in fast-track sales.
Moving forward, the effect of BAPCPA on retail-debtor emergences is
also examined.  Table 7 displays the results of the logistic regression that
quantifies the relationship between the 2005 amendments and the likelihood
of emergence in the retail Chapter 11 cases.
We observe that the “firm size” variable is negatively correlated with the
dependent variable at a statistically significant level of 1%.  Again, this is
consistent with the findings of Dahiya et al., suggesting that larger firms will
obtain DIP financing more easily, and thus are more likely to emerge from
Chapter 11.124  What is of concern here, however, is the BAPCPA variable
and its effect on liquidations.  The results of the study indicate that the 2005
amendments have no statistically significant effect and, therefore, have not
affected retailer emergences.
IV. CONCLUSION
An increasing number of scholars and practitioners argue that Chapter 11
should be reformed.125  The main arguments are that modern Chapter 11
does not fulfill its intended goals and instead leads distressed firms to swift
sales or liquidations.  BAPCPA’s effect on business reorganizations has been
at the center of this debate.  The studies presented in this paper reveal that
the enactment of the creditor-friendly statute BAPCPA has changed the
traditional Chapter 11 landscape by giving rise to rapid dispositions through
pre-plan sales of all or substantially all debtor assets.  The 2005 amendments
changed the debtor-creditor balance by enhancing creditors’ rights and con-
trol over the case and correspondingly weakening the debtor’s position.
What is interesting is that it seems that BAPCPA has affected not only, or
not just mainly as it was initially assumed, retailers, but also firms from all
other corporate sectors as well.  However, it does not seem that the enact-
ment of these 2005 amendments has adversely affected the proportion of
firms that are able to emerge from Chapter 11 whether these firms belong to
124See supra note 89.
125Richard Levin & Kenneth Klee, Rethinking Chapter 11, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 1 (2012)
(noting that “several efforts are underway among the practicing bar to rethink chapter 11, with a view
toward making it work with today’s (and tomorrow’s) economic and financial system,” and discussing
within this context the potential reform of corporate governance, post-petition financing, sale of all or
substantially all debtor’s assets, plan voting and distribution issues).
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the retail or another industry division.  The trend of liquidating Chapter 11s
identified by scholars and practitioners is not associated with the enactment
of the 2005 amendments and, according to Professor Lynn LoPucki, the pro-
portion of debtors that ended up liquidating was increasing even before then.
Particularly, Professor LoPucki has found that “41 firms that filed bank-
ruptcy as public companies each with assets exceeding approximately $218
million liquidated in 2002, although no more than 8 such firms did so in any
year prior to 1999.”126  It follows that repealing the specific 2005 amend-
ments blamed for the unsuccessful business Chapter 11 cases will not help
increase the debtor’s rehabilitation chances.
126Lynn LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm—A Respond to Baird and Rasmussen’s The End of
Bankruptcy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645, note 5 (2003).
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TABLES
Table 1
Sample Debtors by Industry
This table displays the raw and percentage number of sample firms divided by the industry
in which they belong based on the SIC code that has been assigned to them. The upper part
of the cell reports the number and percentage of firms from each corporate sector; these
figures then are further decomposed for each of the pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCA
periods.
Raw and Percentage Number of Firms by
SIC Industry Division
Services 91 (18%)
68 (18%) 23 (17%)
Retailers 63 (12%)
48 (13%) 15 (11%)
Wholesale trade 23 (4%)
22 (6%) 1 (1%)
Manufacturing 189 (36%)
122 (32%) 65 (48%)
Mining 25 (5%)
18 (5%) 7 (5%)
Construction 9 (2%)
4 (1%) 5 (4%)
Transportation, 116 (22%)Communications, Electric, Gas
96 (25%) 20 (14%)
Agricultural Products 3 (1%)
2 (1%) 1 (1%)
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Table 3
Effect of BAPCPA on § 363 sales
The financial information is for the fiscal year in which the company filed for Chapter 11 (year
0). If such data were not available, financial data correspond to the first (year 1) or the second
(year 2) to last year before bankruptcy. The sample consists of financially distressed firms that
filed for Chapter 11 from 1997 to 2011, a total of 506 companies.  All financial data were
obtained from Compustat.  The logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets is used as
a proxy of the firm’s size.
Coefficient P-Value
Constant -1.4023 17%
Long-Term Secured Debt/Total Debt 0.0756 56%
Economic Recession -0.1447 71%
BAPCPA 0.8041 2%**
Current Assets/Total Assets 1.5673 1%***
GDP -2.1443 81%
Firm Size -0.1996 51%
EBITDA/Total Assets -0.0039 99%
••• significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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Table 4
Effect of BAPCPA on Non-Emergences
The financial information is for the fiscal year in which the company filed for Chapter 11 (year
0).  If such data were not available, financial data correspond to the first (year 1) or the second
(year 2) to last year before bankruptcy. The sample consists of financially distressed firms that
filed for Chapter 11 from 1997 to 2011, a total of 506 companies.  All financial data were
obtained from Compustat.  The logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets is used as
a proxy of the firm’s size.
Coefficient P-Value
Constant -0.1343 88%
Long-Term Secured Debt/Total Debt 0.0851 42%
Economic Recession 0.8332 2%**
BAPCPA -0.1072 75%
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.2212 69%
GDP 10.1177 24%
Firm Size -0.2606 33%
EBITDA/ Total Assets -0.1478 75%
••• significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Table 5
Characteristics of Retail Firms that Filed for Chapter 11
between 1990 and 2012
For the total of 376 companies, financial data are drawn from the filing year or, if that data
was unavailable, from the first or second year before filing. All financial data were obtained
from SDC Platinum. Cells report the mean and, in parenthesis, median value.
§ 363 Sales of All or Not § 363 Sales of All or
Substantially All Assets Substantially All Assets
Number of Firms 87 289
Firm Size 2.264 (2.267) 2.105 (2.141)
Total Liabilities/Total 0.663 (0.663) 3.052 (0.967)Assets
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Table 6
Effect of BAPCPA on § 363 Sales of Retailers
Financial data were drawn from, in order of preference, the filing year, the year before filing, or
the second year before filing. The sample consists of financially distressed retailers that filed for
Chapter 11 from 1997 to 2011, a total of 376 companies.  All financial data were obtained
from the SDC Platinum database.  The logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets is
used as a proxy of the firm’s size.
Coefficient P-Value
Constant -6.0995 9%
Economic Recession 0.4043 65%
BAPCPA 6.66 4%**
Total Liabilities/Total Assets -1.8104 1%***
GDP -12.0651 60%
Firm Size 0.2279 67%
••• significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Table 7
Effect of BAPCPA on Non-Emergences of Retailers
Financial data were drawn from, in order of preference, the filing year, the year before filing, or
the second year before filing. The sample consists of financially distressed retailers that filed for
Chapter 11 from 1997 to 2011, a total of 376 companies.  All financial data were obtained
from the SDC Platinum database.  The logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets is
used as a proxy of the firm’s size.
Coefficient P-Value
Constant 2.8734 8%
Economic Recession 0.8006 33%
BAPCPA -0.0053 99.5%
Total Liabilities/Total Assets -0.0643 63%
GDP -29.5818 20%
Firm Size -1.6848 0.38%***
••• significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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FIGURES
Figure 1
Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcies as a Percentage of All




Data drawn from Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
Figure 2
Number of 363 Sales as of the Total of Chapter 11 Cases Disposed, by






















































Recession (I): March 2001-November 2001
Recession (II): December 2007-June 2009
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Figure 3






















































Recession (I): March 2001-November 2001
Recession (II): December 2007-June 2009
Figure 4
363 Sales as a Total Percentage of all Chapter 11 Cases Disposed, by Year











Pre-BAPCPA (1997-2005) Post-BAPCPA (2005-2011)
p-value=1%, double-sided test
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Figure 5
§ 363 Sales of All or Substantially All Assets in Retailer Chapter 11
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Figure 6
Percentage of § 363 Sales in Retailer Chapter 11 Cases for the periods










§363 sales pre-2005 §363 sales post-2005
p-value=0.04%; double-sided test
